西方式民主在全球衰落

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1楼大中小发表于 2010-5-15 21:50 只看该作者

西方式民主在全球衰落

●美媒：●西方式民主●在全球衰落

2010年3月22日 10:30

来源:新华网选稿:陆婷婷

东方网3月22日消息：美国《新闻周刊》3月22日发表文章《民主是如何消亡的》。作者认为，近年来，西方式民主在非洲、拉美、中东和前苏联地区急剧衰落，因为它未能促进经济繁荣，也没给民众带来福祉。而在俄罗斯和中国，大多数人满意国家现状，领导人的民意支持率之高，西方人只有做梦才能得到。

20世纪90年代和本世纪初，政治自由在发展中国家蓬勃发展。尽管在20世纪90年代，独裁主义者仍统治著非洲、东欧和亚洲的大部分地方，但到2005年，民主国家在这几个大洲四处出现。随著萨达姆倒台，塔利班被推翻，土耳其的军事干政明显退出以及伊朗改革派总统哈塔米掌权，就连民主改革长期滞后的中东似乎也添加了这个潮流。2005年，美国自由之家指出，只有9个国家经历了民主政治的倒退，而在其2009年的报告中，该组织称，”非洲、拉美、中东和前苏联40个国家”的民主衰落了。该组织发现，举行选举的民主国家的数量跌回116个，是1995年以来数量最少的。

民主衰落的原因可能会让人感到吃惊。如今，许多曾帮助将独裁者赶下台的中产阶级，感到要创建民主国家是多么困难，并且向往独裁时期。为什么会出现这种情况？在许多案例中，这是由於20世纪90年代出现的年轻民主国家的早期领导人未能认识到自由社会需要强大的制度、执政党的坚定反对派以及妥协的意愿。他们获胜后，就会利用所有权力工具主宰国家，并把好处分给支持者或自己所属的部落。在许多国家，这种对民主的狭隘理解不仅歪曲了这个词的真正含义，还使公众疏远。他们开始厌恶这些看起来与其独裁前任一样、对公众福祉不闻不问的民主人士。

与此同时，小布什政府将伊拉克战争与促进民主联系在一起，这玷污了许多人(尤其是中东许多人)对民主化的看法。

全球经济危机也使民主的魅力下降。对许多发展中国家中产阶级来说，民主的传播是与资本主义的传播联系在一起的，因为其中许多国家在接纳政治自由的同时也会开放经济。随著经济危机使人们的收入减少，许多人认为经济陷入低迷在一定程度上是民主造成的。多明尼加总统费尔南德斯在2008年拉美领导人峰会上声称：”对这个地区(拉美)民主前景的期待让位於幻灭，因为民主未能促进经济繁荣。”

结果，在几乎所有大洲，民主都在逐渐消亡。在伊拉克，萨达姆之后的首批领导人，依靠最粗鲁的恐吓手段击败敌人并上升到政治体系的最高端，使人民大失所望。在最近的伊拉克选举中，投票率较2005年选举时下降，尽管有大量广告鼓励人们投票。在菲律宾总统阿罗约统治下，安全部队绑架和杀害左翼活动人士的事件日益增多。在柬埔寨，首相洪森及其领导的政党在对他们百依百顺的法庭上以诽谤罪控告他人，据称还殴打和杀害活动人士以实现对政治体系的完全控制，尽管他们也是经选举上台的。而在许多非洲国家，所谓改革者，如肯亚现任总统齐贝吉，在发誓促进真正的政治自由后上台，但很快就只是利用自己的职位打击对手和照顾本族的支持者。

这种现象最明显的例证之一就是泰国。20世纪90年代，泰国被许多人视为世界上前途最光明的年轻民主国家之一。2001年，乘著重创泰国的亚洲金融危机过后民众普遍不满的风潮，身为亿万富翁的电信巨头他信承诺重振经济并对在全国占大多数、但在历史上被身为精英阶层的泰国政治家不屑一顾的穷人实施社会福利计划，从而在全国大选中获胜。他信一就职就兑现了他许下的一些民粹主义承诺：他的政府启动了全民医保计划，向每个村庄发放贷款以推动经济增长。这位总理进行了一次经过精心策划的、倾听穷人声音的政治秀，拜访一个又一个村庄，倾听哪怕最为琐碎的抱怨。

然而，他信并非像他一开始表现的那样是泰国民主的福音。反而，他开始破坏泰国许多年轻的民主制度。他摧毁了行政机构和司法系统，用自己的亲信替换独立思考者，据称还让支持者收购媒体集团，然后压制批评性报道，从而让媒体闭嘴。在泰国宣布”对毒品开战”后，国内外人权组织指责他信宽恕安全部队违反法律程序从事谋杀和致人失踪的行为。在缉毒战争期间，共有2500多人神秘死亡。

这种攫取权力的行为最令人讨厌的影响之一就是，在许多近来民主出现倒退的国家，曾经推动政治自由的中产阶级现在也诉诸未经法律许可的、不民主的策略。例如，泰国中产阶级城市居民对他信滥用权力深感失望，担心他会牺牲他们，授权给穷人。他们没有通过民主程序与他信对抗，而是通过关闭政府机构和要求发动军事政变来破坏民主。为了首先将他信、接著将他的支持者赶下台，成群的抗议者在2006年、2007年和2008年试图使曼谷陷入瘫痪，对议会发动包围，并在2008年接管了主要机场。许多人要求进行军事干预，或实行其他类型的良性独裁，以恢复法治并打击腐败。他们声称，在他信统治时期，法治状况恶化了，腐败也更加严重。泰国精英阶层得到了他们想要的东西：他信流亡海外，他的反对者当权，而泰国的民主被摧毁了。

其他地方也出现了类似的模式。在菲律宾，上一代人曾为打倒独裁者马科斯而聚集在一起。而马尼拉的中产阶级为了将埃斯特拉达赶下台再次聚集。埃斯特拉达是经民众选举上台的，受到穷人爱戴，却被控大肆贪污受贿。在埃斯特拉达下台后，同一批中产阶级抗议者当中的许多人又试图将阿罗约赶下台。

许多发展中国家中产阶级活动人士对这些选举生成的独裁者感到失望，对年轻的民主国家发生的贪污受贿行为感到灰心。如今，他们甚至渴望回到过去的独裁统治时期。在非洲，毛里塔尼亚和尼日最近发生的军事政变受到城市中产阶级欢迎，而亚洲民主动态调查的数据显示，许多受调查者对他们的民主制度感到不满。俄罗斯的情况也是如此。尽管普京废除了大多数民主制度，但他在中产阶级和其他人群中享有高得惊人的民意支持率。民调显示，大约80%的俄罗斯人说他们对普京的表现感到满意。西方领导人唯有做梦才能享有这样的民意支持率。

中产阶级通过军事政变和其他独裁手段使民主倒退，剥夺了穷人的公民权，这引发了更多的抗议活动。在泰国，成群的抗议者发动了针对试图将他信赶下台的中产阶级的暴力示威。这些抗议者大多是穷人。在菲律宾，贫困男女对中产阶级将他们的英雄埃斯特拉达赶下台感到愤怒，发起他们自己的抗议活动予以还击。如今，随著菲律宾又将举行选举，已出狱并再次参选的埃斯特拉达正获得穷人对其参选总统的支持。这些还击式的抗议活动导致阶级对立，可能需要几代人的时间才能和解。

最大的问题也许是在伊拉克。许多人曾对萨达姆倒台后的生活抱有很高期望，然而，对民主的支持很快就下降了，部分原因是伊拉克中产阶级目睹了新政治体系的混乱和政治内讧。在2003年过后，许多伊拉克中产阶级人士开始渴望重新出现一位独裁统治者，即便是像萨达姆那样残暴的统治者。

Terminusbot 整理，讨论请前往 2049bbs.xyz

DaemonEye

不河蟹的围观团团员

2楼大中小发表于 2010-5-15 21:52 只看该作者

国际5毛…出钱发的文章吧

透露社记者

3楼大中小发表于 2010-5-15 21:56 只看该作者

同志们，解放全人类的时机到了！

同志们，冲啊！升官发财的机会到了！

江湖席

4楼大中小发表于 2010-5-15 22:01 只看该作者

How Democracy Dies

A global decline in political freedom is partly the fault of the middle class.

By Joshua Kurlantzick NEWSWEEK

Published Mar 12, 2010

From the magazine issue dated Mar 22, 2010

Political freedom blossomed in the developing world in the 1990s and early

part of this century. While authoritarians still ruled most of Africa, Eastern

Europe, and Asia in 1990, by 2005 democracies had emerged across these

continents. The Soviet Union had morphed into Russia, a freewheeling society

that seemed to bear little resemblance to its grim predecessor. With the fall

of Saddam Hussein, the overthrow of the Taliban, the apparent end of military

interventions in Turkey, and the reformist presidency of Mohammad Khatami in

Iran, even the Middle East, long the laggard in democratic reform, appeared to

be joining the trend. In 2005, Freedom House noted that only nine countries

experienced rollbacks of democracy; in its report in 2009, it registered

declines in “40 countries in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and the

former Soviet Union.” Indeed, the organization found that the number of

electoral democracies had fallen back to 116, its lowest number since 1995.

The culprits in democracy’s decline may come as a surprise. Many of the same

middle-class men and women who once helped push dictators out of power are now

seeing just how difficult it can be to establish democracy, and are pining for

the days of autocracy. Why has this happened? In many cases because the early

leaders of the young democracies that emerged in the 1990s failed to recognize

that free societies require strong institutions, a loyal opposition to the

ruling party, and a willingness to compromise. Instead, they saw democracy as

just semiregular votes; after they won, they then used all tools of power to

dominate their countries and to hand out benefits to their allies or tribe.

This narrow interpretation of democracy not only distorted the true meaning of

the word but also alienated the public in many countries, who became disgusted

that these democrats seemed no more committed to the common good than their

authoritarian predecessors.

Too often, Western nations, which after 9/11 refocused their attention from

the democratization of the 1990s to the war on terror, said little as

democracy went down the drain. Sometimes, the West simply no longer had the

time to stand up for democrats abroad. Other times, as in the case of Malaysia

and Pakistan, authoritarian rule suddenly benefited the West, since the U.S.

could rely on autocrats to help detain terror suspects indefinitely.

Meanwhile, the Bush administration’s linkage of the war in Iraq to democracy

promotion tainted democratization in the minds of many, particularly in the

Middle East.

The global economic crisis has also damaged democracy’s appeal. To many

middle-class men and women in the developing world, the spread of democracy

was linked to the spread of capitalism, since many of these countries opened

their economies at the same time as they embraced political freedom. As the

crisis cuts into people’s incomes, many blame democracy, in part, for the

economic downturn. Dominican President Leonel Fernández said as much.

“Expectations over the prospects of democracy in the region [Latin America]

have given way to disillusion as democracy failed to boost economic

prosperity,” he declared at a summit of Latin leaders in 2008.

The result is that on nearly every continent, democracy is sputtering out. In

Iraq, the first post-Saddam leaders relied on the bluntest tools of

intimidation to defeat their rivals and rise to the top of the political

system, disillusioning the population. In the recent Iraq election, voter

turnout dropped from the 2005 poll, despite extensive advertising prodding

people to vote. In the Philippines, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo in 2006

used an emergency decree to, in effect, declare martial law, and her reign has

coincided with an increasing number of abductions and killings of left-wing

activists by the security forces. In Cambodia, Prime Minister Hun Sen and his

party, though also elected, have used libel suits in compliant courts and,

allegedly, beatings and killings of activists to gain total control of the

political system. In Russia, starting in 2000, Vladimir Putin took advantage

of widespread anger at the collapse of Russia’s economy in the 1990s to push

through changes that crushed any chance for real democracy, replacing elected

regional governors with ones appointed by the Kremlin, taking over nearly

every independent political party, and neutering most of the media.

Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez has for more than a decade used his oil wealth to

maintain broad popularity with the poor, winning election after election even

while turning virtually the entire political establishment into a sycophantic

chorus by shutting down independent media outlets, packing prominent state

companies with his cronies, and using a national referendum to wipe out his

term limits. And in many African countries, so-called reformers, like current

Kenyan President Mwai Kibaki, came to power vowing to promote real political

freedom but soon used their office simply to crush rivals and favor their own

ethnic allies.

One of the starkest examples of this phenomenon has been Thailand, which was

considered by many in the 1990s to be one of the most promising young

democracies in the world. Since then it has suffered one of the greatest

comedowns. In the 1990s, Thailand passed one of the most progressive

constitutions in the developing world, built a vibrant NGO culture that

rivaled any in the West, and midwifed an unrestrained media that dug into

scandal after scandal. In 2001, riding a wave of popular discontent following

the Asian financial crisis, which had decimated Thailand’s economy, Thaksin

Shinawatra, a billionaire telecommunications magnate, won national elections

on a promise to right the economy and bring social welfare programs to the

poor, who make up the majority of the country but historically had been

treated with disdain by elite Thai politicians. Once in office, Thaksin

delivered on some of his populist pledges: his government launched a universal

health-care scheme and delivered loans to each village to kick-start economic

growth. The prime minister made an elaborate show of listening to the poor,

traveling from village to village to hear even the most minor complaints.

But Thaksin wasn’t the boon to Thailand’s democracy that he seemed at first.

Instead, even as he was extending social protections he set about undermining

many of Thailand’s young democratic institutions. He gutted the civil service

and the judiciary, replacing independent thinkers with cronies, and silenced

the media by allegedly having allies buy into media groups and then silence

critical reporting. Declaring a “war on drugs,” Thaksin was accused by

international and domestic human-rights groups of condoning extrajudicial

killings and disappearances by the security forces. Prominent human-rights

activists like lawyer Somchai Neelapaichit have simply vanished. Overall, more

than 2,500 people died mysteriously during the drug war. Michael Montesano, an

expert on Thai politics at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in

Singapore, says that Thaksin more closely resembles a Latin American caudillo,

such as Juan Perón, than a democratic politician.

One of the unlikely effects of such power grabs has been that in many of the

countries where democracy has recently been rolled back, the middle class that

once promoted political freedom is now also resorting to extralegal,

undemocratic tactics—supposedly to save democracy itself. Middle-class Thai

urbanites, for instance, bitterly disappointed by Thaksin’s abuses and worried

he was empowering the poor at their expense, have rebelled. Rather than

challenging Thaksin through the democratic process, such as by bolstering

opposition parties or starting their own newspapers, they tore down democracy

by shutting down institutions of government and calling for a military coup,

even while claiming to support democracy. In order to push first Thaksin and

then his allies out of office, mobs of protestors tried to paralyze Bangkok in

2006, 2007, and 2008, launching a siege of Parliament and, in 2008, taking

over the main airport, a move that wreaked havoc on travel to the country.

Many called for a military intervention or some other kind of benign despotism

to restore the rule of law and fight corruption, which they claimed had

worsened under Thaksin. “We had to save democracy, even if it meant [ignoring]

elections,” said one Thai diplomat sympathetic to the protesters. The Thai

elites got what they hoped for: Thaksin is in exile, his opponents are in

power, and Thailand’s democracy is shattered.

A similar pattern has played out elsewhere. Middle-class demonstrators in the

wealthier eastern part of Bolivia have launched an antigovernment campaign

against President Evo Morales, a populist former union leader who has tried to

redistribute wealth, nationalize businesses, and use a national referendum to

dramatically increase his own powers. In the Philippines, where a previous

generation of Filipinos had gathered to bring down the dictator Ferdinand

Marcos, middle-class Manila residents came together again to force out Joseph

Estrada, popularly elected and beloved by the poor but accused of massive

graft. After Estrada left office, many of the same middle-class protestors

turned out in attempts to force out Macapagal Arroyo, though she survived and

remains in office.

Disappointed with these elected autocrats and frustrated with the graft of

young democracies, many middle-class activists in developing nations are now

even longing for the old days of authoritarian rule. In Africa, recent coups

in Mauritania and Niger were welcomed by the urban middle class, while data

from the Asian Barometer surveys, regular polls that examine Asian attitudes

toward democracy, show that many respondents have become dissatisfied with

their democratic systems. “Support [in Asia] for authoritarianism is growing

rather than diminishing,” argue Yu-tzung Chang, Yunhan Zhu, and Chong-min Pak

in an article titled “Authoritarian Nostalgia in Asia.” Such is the case in

Russia as well, where Putin, even as he wipes out most of the democratic

institutions, enjoys staggeringly high poll numbers from the middle class and

other segments of the population. In one recent Angus Reid poll, some 80

percent of Russians said they approved of Putin’s performance, ratings that

Western leaders can only dream of. Even in China, where it is the poor in

rural areas who now take the lead in protests, the urban middle class appears

comfortable with the ruling regime. In a Pew study focused on urban areas, a

large majority of Chinese reported that they were happy with national

conditions.

The middle class’s push back against democracy, by way of coups and other

antidemocratic means, has disenfranchised the poor, sparking still more

protests. In Thailand, crowds of protesters, most of them poor, have launched

their own violent demonstrations that target the middle classes who tried to

push Thaksin out of office. Similarly in Bolivia, the middle-class anti-

Morales protesters now have been met with angry pro-Morales protesters mostly

drawn from the ranks of the poor. In the Philippines, poor men and women

furious that their hero Estrada had been forced out by the middle class

launched their own counter-protests. Now, with the nation heading to another

election, Estrada, out of jail and running again, is picking up support from

the poor for his presidential bid.

These counterprotests have led to class divides that could take generations to

reconcile. After more than a decade of fragile democracy, many institutions

created in the 1990s have been destroyed, and those in power have few

remaining tools to resolve political tensions. In Russia, for instance, even

if a leader came into office who wanted to restore more freedoms, he or she

would have to fight the Putinesque system and bureaucracy, which have

centralized all power in the Kremlin. In Thailand, even if current Prime

Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva wanted to return the country to the freedom of the

1990s, he couldn’t, because during Thaksin’s rule and then after the coup,

Thailand’s rulers tore up its reformist constitution, ruined the courts, and

so politicized the media that newspapers now slavishly back either the pro- or

anti-Thaksin forces. It would take years, if not decades, for a new leader to

rebuild the civil service, courts, and other institutions with the type of

trained, impartial people who’d been developed before.

Perhaps the greatest problems are in Iraq, where millions of voters headed to

the polls last week for the second time since the fall of Saddam Hussein. Many

had high expectations for life after the fall of Saddam, but support for

democracy soon dropped off in part because middle-class Iraqis witnessed the

turmoil and political infighting of a new political system. At the worst

moments of Iraq’s post-2003 chaos, when the idea of Iraq becoming a model

democracy for the Middle East seemed insane, many middle-class Iraqis,

particularly Sunnis, began longing for the return of an authoritarian ruler,

even one as brutal as Saddam. In one 2007 ABC News survey, only 43 percent of

Iraqis thought democracy would be the best political system for their country.

The turnout for the most recent election suggests many Iraqis remain

disillusioned. And even if their democracy develops, they can’t let down their

guard. The history of other young democracies reveals just how fragile this

success can be.

Kurlantzick is fellow for Southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations.

观棋不语

这个时代，纯粹的不含丝毫杂质的傻逼已经不多见了，但是还是有的。

5楼大中小发表于 2010-5-15 22:08 只看该作者

太无耻了。

谷哥谷歌

6楼大中小发表于 2010-5-15 22:14 只看该作者

新华社选稿人员见到这文章定是激动地热泪盈眶了,定有相见恨晚的感觉.

strongwind13

坦白从严，抗拒从残。84呃党自认九袋马仔被认副党魁

7楼大中小发表于 2010-5-15 22:14 只看该作者

【作者认为，近年来，西方式民主在非洲、拉美、中东和前苏联地区急剧衰落，因为它未能促进经济繁荣，也没给民众带来福祉。而在俄罗斯和中国，大多数人满意国家现状，领导人的民意支持率之高，西方人只有做梦才能得到。】

卧槽泥马勒戈壁，西式民主还跑苏联去过呢。

胡锦涛：我也不想当主席，是全国人民选我当的……

江南的雨季

My Blog:Jitler.Com Twitter:@yxzjn

8楼大中小发表于 2010-5-15 22:17 只看该作者

?这么不是4月1日发的？

黑衣大葛格

纯阳真人

9楼大中小发表于 2010-5-15 22:36 只看该作者

所以2012全人类都灭亡了

zhangdsh

10楼大中小发表于 2010-5-15 22:37 只看该作者

外国五毛党也不少嘛

DaemonEye

不河蟹的围观团团员

11楼大中小发表于 2010-5-15 22:39 只看该作者

Even in China, where it is the poor in rural areas who now take the lead in

protests, the urban middle class appears comfortable with the ruling regime.

In a Pew study focused on urban areas, a large majority of Chinese reported

that they were happy with national

conditions.作者认为，近年来，西方式民主在非洲、拉美、中东和前苏联地区急剧衰落，因为它未能促进经济繁荣，也没给民众带来福祉。而在俄罗斯和中国，大多数人满意国家现状，领导人的民意支持率之高，西方人只有做梦才能得到。

这两句话意思有偏差啊它只提到城市中产阶级满足现状也没说支持领导人啊这位怎么翻译的

nkpoper

12楼大中小发表于 2010-5-15 22:47 只看该作者

中产阶级衰落，是不可避免的。因为中产阶级的存在有特定的历史背景，这个背景已经不存在了。（这个主要就是：商业全球化、人力和信息尚未全球化）

因此，某种形式的无产阶级民主是会取而代之的。

但是，“无产阶级民主”不等于“反民主”，它只是与中产阶级民主（就是现在所谓的西方民主）略有差异而已。

此外，无产阶级也不同于历史上的无产阶级，因为它一度的核心”产业无产阶级“或”产业工人阶级“，比中产阶级衰落得更严重，使无产阶级的性质已经大为不同，甚至用这个词都不大合适了。

闹了个运

Twitter @naoyunhui 不算激情革命派，但是心情容易激动，有正义感，骨子里还是偏温和，要是玩不过你，就颠儿。

13楼大中小发表于 2010-5-15 22:58 只看该作者

请米国人民组党选举共产党上台施行集权统治，谢谢

青铜骑士

14楼大中小发表于 2010-5-15 23:23 只看该作者

林子大了，什幺虾米都有啊

Yhard

15楼大中小发表于 2010-5-15 23:33 只看该作者

别做梦了，西方大国想进入社会主义社会是不现实的，因为资本主义中国必然会摧毁西方的“无产阶级民主”

nkpoper

16楼大中小发表于 2010-5-15 23:37 只看该作者

引用:

原帖由 Yhard 于 2010-5-15 23:33 发表

别做梦了，西方大国想进入社会主义社会是不现实的，因为资本主义中国必然会摧毁西方的“无产阶级民主”

你这个话最精辟了，呵呵，我要学习一下这种表达方式。

肉の包包

我借用某人账号,然后把原密码改了,善哉…

17楼大中小发表于 2010-5-15 23:53 只看该作者

找不到原文地址啊。

singlefabulous

18楼大中小发表于 2010-5-16 00:21 只看该作者

YY强国

yang1234

19楼大中小发表于 2010-5-16 00:53 只看该作者

引用:

原帖由黑衣大葛格于 2010-5-15 22:36 发表

所以2012全人类都灭亡了

+1984

houman

20楼大中小发表于 2010-5-16 00:58 只看该作者

引用:

原帖由肉の包包于 2010-5-15 23:53 发表

找不到原文地址啊。

上文就在上面，只不过咱的记者同志读出了原文没有的内容。

我卖糕的该用户已被删除

21楼大中小发表于 2010-5-16 01:01 只看该作者

看完标题为直奔出处，当看到新华网三个字的时候，我会心而淫荡地笑了

TG选择性报道的本领，几十年来忽悠了无数爱国青年。让他们一直处于高潮中，直到莫名死去。

花想容

依据用户管理细则，账号永久停用。

22楼大中小发表于 2010-5-16 02:17 只看该作者

引用:

原帖由 DaemonEye 于 2010-5-15 21:52 发表

国际5毛…出钱发的文章吧

不是，人家这个是学术文章，从宏观历史出发实证地说明一些现象，与作者本人立场无关。

北京棋迷有时想冒充这类西方观察者，但他有另一种立场，装得不像。

浪雪

23楼大中小发表于 2010-5-16 03:08 只看该作者

老外又天真了。天朝人民的要求是多么低啊，洋大人们要是来天朝享受国民待遇早出离愤怒了吧。标准不一样肯定得到的结果不一样。

bester

24楼大中小发表于 2010-5-16 03:53 只看该作者

引用:

原帖由 DaemonEye 于 2010-5-15 22:39 发表

Even in China, where it is the poor in rural areas who now take the lead in

protests, the urban middle class appears comfortable with the ruling regime.

In a Pew study focused on urban areas, a large …

這句話說雖然農村地區的貧民現在成了反抗的主力，城市地區的中產階級對於現狀還是很適應的。

未来他老爸

25楼大中小发表于 2010-5-16 10:29 只看该作者

女五毛吖

来源:新华网

选稿:陆婷婷

sayhaj

26楼大中小发表于 2010-5-16 10:37 只看该作者

幼稚

q3ccn

有关部门夸我帅…

27楼大中小发表于 2010-5-16 10:56 只看该作者

国际5毛用什么货币结算？？

彩虹咖啡馆

28楼大中小发表于 2010-5-16 11:20 只看该作者

两年前我在冬季就已觉得民主及其追求者会被边缘化。现在这种感觉越发强烈和确定。不知是喜是悲。

blue_sky

强力围观人士

29楼大中小发表于 2010-5-16 11:26 只看该作者

引用:

原帖由 Yhard 于 2010-5-15 23:33 发表

别做梦了，西方大国想进入社会主义社会是不现实的，因为资本主义中国必然会摧毁西方的“无产阶级民主”

非常精辟

王红梅

30楼大中小发表于 2010-5-16 11:55 只看该作者

这篇文章的原作者肯定不是五毛，这只不过是西方多元化模式的一个体现而已。

爱推蝌蝌

31楼大中小发表于 2010-5-16 12:35 只看该作者

民主国家能谈谈民主之死，独裁国家能谈谈独裁之死否？

花想容

依据用户管理细则，账号永久停用。

32楼大中小发表于 2010-5-16 12:55 只看该作者

引用:

原帖由彩虹咖啡馆于 2010-5-16 11:20 发表

两年前我在冬季就已觉得民主及其追求者会被边缘化。现在这种感觉越发强烈和确定。不知是喜是悲。

这是北京模式的成功（so

far）造成的。是喜是悲其实不重要，重要的是觉得是喜和是悲的人应该都可以从现实出发讨论这个现象。本文的作者就是这样做的。历史上雅典被斯巴达打败过，1939年英美都有很多人相信民主制度走到了尽头，冷战时也有，而今天北京政权对民主的威胁并不比苏联小，肯定比第三帝国大，作者有这种危机感不是很正常么，如果没有危机感才是麻木不仁呢。

花想容

依据用户管理细则，账号永久停用。

33楼大中小发表于 2010-5-16 12:58 只看该作者

另外，从现实政治层面来讲，任何能引起西方民众对北京政权警惕、反感、敌意的言论，对我们都很有好处，否则岂不是要温水煮青蛙，被TG玩死。

jimine

圍觀共產黨 , 再見共產黨 ;

34楼大中小发表于 2010-5-16 12:59 只看该作者

国际民主与国内民主不要分割

罗斯福总统在其致美国第七十八届国会咨文中，提到了美国国内右派反动分子的问题。他说：“真的，如果这种反动发展了，如果要重演，而我们又回到一九二○年后的所谓‘正常’时代，那么，我们敢断定，我们纵然在国外战场上克服敌人，但在国内也必屈服于法西斯主义之下”。罗斯福总统在这里不但为美国国内提出了右派反动的问题，而且为其他许多国家国内提出了右派反动的问题。我们敢说：许多重要国家国内的右派反动问题，决不止于是一个国内问题，这必然成为一个国际问题。由于一个国家在国内屈服于法西斯主义之下，因而它在国际间也必然成为法西斯主义的支柱，而不能为民主主义的支柱。以故目前讲求国际民主的人，首先就要讲求国内的民主。国际民主既然与国内民主不可分割，所以要想参加到世界民主国家家庭中去的人们，就无法违反国内民主的原则。因为今天世界上所最恐惧的东西就是法西斯主义。罗期福总统主张免除恐惧的自由，应当首先解释为把法西斯的威胁和恐怖加以彻底免除的自由。如果任何国家国内关于法西斯的恐惧，没有彻底免除，那就等于整个国际间关于法西斯的恐惧，没有解除。

无论国内的民主也好，国际的民主也好，都要从本质上表现，形式是次要的问题。从根本上讲，民主就是人权。人权不外乎行使人民的权力以及享受人民的权利。人民无法行使权力，也就无法享受权利。目前测量民主的程度，不仅是拿享受权利来做标准，而且是拿行使权力来做标准。我们不要以为言论出版集会结社的自由，仅仅是一个权利问题；实际上，这是一个权力问题。只有实际行使这种权力；才能叫做享受权利。

在这次反法西斯主义的战争中，在英美两大民主国家中，绝大多数人民都感觉到他们国内的民主非常不够。罗斯福在其咨文中提出要承认一个《第二人权宣言》。在保障人权方面，我们中国更应当与我们的伟大盟邦——美国——竞赛。再者，民主与和平是密切联系的。这就是说，国内的民主与国内的和平是密切联系着。同时，任何国家内的民主与和平又与国际的民主与和平密切联系着。我们中国今天与英美两大盟邦比肩作战。……因此，也就是为了国际的民主与和平而斗争。

——《新华日报》1944年1月19日社论

Dungener

35楼大中小发表于 2010-5-16 14:20 只看该作者

TG口口声声说资本主义在中国是走不通的。香港、澳门、台湾被一棍子打出中国了

雲山霧罩

36楼大中小发表于 2010-5-16 15:39 只看该作者

引用:

原帖由 q3ccn 于 2010-5-16 10:56 发表

国际5毛用什么货币结算？？

底下说“党政分开”上面分得开么？

中央党务开支一年多少？

中联部/中宣部/对外联络部、、、、开支公开过么？

天知道是不是在美国传媒上面花钱做的广告？

weke

挪威.奥斯陆

37楼大中小发表于 2010-5-16 15:44 只看该作者

天朝可以解放全人类鸟。

stevenking

The real Slim Shady never stands up.

38楼大中小发表于 2010-5-16 15:48 只看该作者

民主你个鸡巴，你懂个P啊。

Yahoo!

ChrisDempsey

球迷-職業球迷-體育評論者-愛好自由的人 Twitter:@Chris_dempsey

39楼大中小发表于 2010-5-16 17:00 只看该作者

“而在俄罗斯和中国，大多数人满意国家现状，领导人的民意支持率之高，西方人只有做梦才能得到。”

這句是真的

小龙人

草马族族民

40楼大中小发表于 2010-5-16 17:06 只看该作者

引用:

原帖由 ChrisDempsey 于 2010-5-16 17:00 发表

“而在俄罗斯和中国，大多数人满意国家现状，领导人的民意支持率之高，西方人只有做梦才能得到。”

這句是真的

真个鸟，表乱代表

nkpoper

41楼大中小发表于 2010-5-16 18:45 只看该作者

俄罗斯的贫富差距可比中国小多了。

藏獒兄

狼牙山五壮士要多壮有多壮 @wang2

42楼大中小发表于 2010-5-16 19:28 只看该作者

出口转内销？

Tamias

酱油党党魁

43楼大中小发表于 2010-5-16 19:36 只看该作者

人类历史的发展其实存在着一定的周期率的

民主国家时多时少，但最终的结果还是人类的进步

而美国的知识分子在民主势头大的时候就开始谈论历史的终结

在民主势头小的时候就说民主的危机

其实有点杞人忧天

亚瑟

44楼大中小发表于 2010-5-16 22:02 只看该作者

8楼大中小发表于 2010-5-15 22:14 只看该作者

卧槽泥马勒戈壁，西式民主还跑苏联去过呢。

胡锦涛：我也不想当主席，是全国人民选我当的……

==========

借你第一句给后一行.

神仙一溜烟

杵君

45楼大中小发表于 2010-5-17 02:10 只看该作者

底层民众就是一帮无知的垃圾！不但懒，还想贪，趁着混乱就会抢。

jimine

圍觀共產黨 , 再見共產黨 ;

46楼大中小发表于 2010-5-17 08:23 只看该作者

引用:

原帖由 Dungener 于 2010-5-16 14:20 发表

TG口口声声说资本主义在中国是走不通的。香港、澳门、台湾被一棍子打出中国了

\\我這個澳門人倒希望澳門被一棒子打出大陸政治範圍 .

风餐露宿

47楼大中小发表于 2010-5-17 08:38 只看该作者

引用:

原帖由 vanejurii 于 2010-5-15 21:57 发表

缺乏民主要素，基础社会结构不符合民主要求，当然这是可以改进，但是靠自发改进，我看这些国家都难。

改进基础社会结构是一个重点，西方的基础结构良好，和基督教长达千年的融合有一定关系。

中国的民主要素比 …

别扯基督教好吗？事实上基督教中的天主教的问题，正是西方社会当年民主化的障碍。

[ 本帖最后由风餐露宿于 2010-5-17 09:42 编辑 ]

写实

自由，就是宽容异端的思想言论

48楼大中小发表于 2010-5-17 09:04 只看该作者

引用:

原帖由风餐露宿于 2010-5-17 08:38 发表

别扯基督教好吗？事实上基督教中的天主教的问题，正式西方社会当年民主化的障碍。

宪政民主是各种权力相互制衡的结果，无论哪种权力独大都会成为专制，而西方的民主化进程也绝对不能少了各地天主教会对于世俗王权朝廷的制衡作用，否则欧洲宪政民主也是无望。

nkpoper

49楼大中小发表于 2010-5-17 09:19 只看该作者

引用:

原帖由写实于 2010-5-17 09:04 发表

宪政民主是各种权力相互制衡的结果，无论哪种权力独大都会成为专制，而西方的民主化进程也绝对不能少了各地天主教会对于世俗王权朝廷的制衡作用，否则欧洲宪政民主也是无望。

赞扬基督教的，一般有两种认识：

第一种认识，是认为基督教是正义的、民主的、自由的；

另一种认识，是认为基督教有实力，连天主教会这样长期搞神权统治的邪恶势力，也有助于制衡。

两者当然都可以讨论，但是用后者给前者圆场就太无聊了吧？

另外，于中国现实而言，基督教的政治意义还不如轮子。

Cena

老蔡。蔡呐，音谐瓷器，与法科。到这里，只图个，无目的消磨。

50楼大中小发表于 2010-5-17 09:25 只看该作者

引用:

原帖由 bester 于 2010-5-16 03:53 发表

+1

這句話說雖然農村地區的貧民現在成了反抗的主力，城市地區的中產階級對於現狀還是很適應的。

属实

56 12››

西方式民主 在全球衰落

西方式民主在全球衰落