求教，襠中央上層分為哪幾個幫派.
人民英雄紀念碑
佛曰：得道多助，失道寡助
1楼 大 中 小 发表于 2009-6-13 05:18 只看该作者
求教，襠中央上層分為哪幾個幫派.
要想消滅它，先要瞭解它。
Terminusbot 整理，讨论请前往 2049bbs.xyz
bafield
日人民报特约评论员
2楼 大 中 小 发表于 2009-6-13 10:45 只看该作者
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luckyray
不明真相
3楼 大 中 小 发表于 2009-6-13 10:46 只看该作者
P民不宜
袖手看热闹
4楼 大 中 小 发表于 2009-6-13 15:17 只看该作者
先回答嫩的问题，分两派，一个捞权派，一个捞钱派
俺压根就木有想过消灭它，就是怕它消灭俺
sin
群众
5楼 大 中 小 发表于 2009-6-30 19:15 只看该作者
维基百科有.
我是五毛党
真理部部长
6楼 大 中 小 发表于 2009-6-30 21:04 只看该作者
江派和胡☭
numberscis
收二手或库存的老钢笔、蘸水笔。免费维修钢笔，免费调校、打磨笔尖。尊重世界上所有以匠人性格工作和治学的民族，毋论是日耳曼还是和族。
7楼 大 中 小 发表于 2009-7-1 01:55 只看该作者
被公认为世界上最有影响力的国际时事刊物之一，创始人是美国政治学“泰斗”亨廷顿。诞生在1970年的《外交政策》杂志专门鼓励所有对美国外交政策上面临的至关重要的问题而引发的争论。至今，这本以美国首都华盛顿为总部的杂志已经成为了一个云集有深度讨论的论坛和新主张、新观念的信息来源。
China’s Team of Rivals
中国的派系斗争
By Cheng Li
March/April 2009
A financial meltdown in China promises to test the Communist Party’s power in
ways not seen since Tiananmen. But theirs is a house divided, as princelings
take on populists and Pekinologists try to make sense of it all. Will this
team built for economic success implode once the money dries up? An insider’s
guide to the leaders at China’s controls.
中国的金融危机很可能成为自“天安门事件”以来，对共产党执政能力的一次前所未有的考验。而如今，（共产党内部）却出现了分化，出现了“太子党”与“平民派”的对立,"北京学家”又尝试着去解读所有这一切。
当财富一旦耗尽，这个以经济建设为己任的团队会不会发生“内爆”呢？（请看）一知情人对中国领导人物所作的介绍。
The two dozen senior politicians who walk the halls of Zhongnanhai, the
compound of the Chinese Communist Party’s leadership in Beijing, are worried.
What was inconceivable a year ago now threatens their rule: an economy in
freefall. Exports, critical to China’s searing economic growth, have plunged.
Thousands of factories and businesses, especially those in the prosperous
coastal regions, have closed. In the last six months of 2008, 10 million
workers, plus 1 million new college graduates, joined the already gigantic
ranks of the country’s unemployed. During the same period, the Chinese stock
market lost 65 percent of its value, equivalent to $3 trillion. The crisis,
President Hu Jintao said recently, “is a test of our ability to control a
complex situation, and also a test of our party’s governing ability.”
二十几位高官，进出于“中南海”--中国共产党位于北京的权力核心，（他们）看上去忧心忡忡。在一年前还是不可思议的事，现在却正威胁着他们的统治：经济快速下行，推动中国经济高速增长的出口急速下滑。数以千计的工厂和企业，特别是那些处于沿海繁华地区的很多工厂和企业都已悉数倒闭。
在2008年的下半年，一千万工人，和一百万应届大学毕业生都加入到就业大军的行列。同一时期，中国的股市缩水65%，折合30亿美元。面临这些危机，胡锦涛主席最近表示：“这是对我们控制复杂局势能力的一次考验，是对我们党执政能力的一次考验。”
With this rapid downturn, the Chinese Communist Party suddenly looks
vulnerable. Since Deng Xiaoping initiated economic reforms three decades ago,
the party’s legitimacy has relied upon its ability to keep the economy running
at breakneck pace. If China is no longer able to maintain a high growth rate
or provide jobs for its ever growing labor force, massive public
dissatisfaction and social unrest could erupt. No one realizes this
possibility more than the handful of people who steer China’s massive economy.
Double-digit growth has sheltered them through a SARS epidemic, massive
earthquakes, and contamination scandals. Now, the crucial question is whether
they are equipped to handle an economic crisis of this magnitude—and survive
the political challenges it will bring.
随着经济形势的急转直下，中国共产党一下子却显得很脆弱。自从30年前邓小平的经济改革政策实施以来，依靠保持经济的飞速发展，共产党的合法性才得以承认。如果中国不再保持高增长率，或满足日益扩张的劳动力对工作岗位的需求，那么这将诱发公众的不满情绪和社会的动荡。（至于这一点），没有谁比中国那少数几个掌控巨额（国家）经济的人更清楚的了。两位数的（经济）增长使他们得以顺利度过了非典，大地震，和（毒奶粉）污染丑闻。现在，最关键的问题是，他们是否有能力去应对眼前如此大规模的经济危机，并且在这场因经济危机所带来的政治挑战中幸存下来。
This year marks the 60th anniversary of the People’s Republic, and the ruling
party is no longer led by one strongman, like Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping.
Instead, the Politburo and its Standing Committee, China’s most powerful body,
are run by two informal coalitions that compete against each other for power,
influence, and control over policy. Competition in the Communist Party is, of
course, nothing new. But the jockeying today is no longer a zero-sum game in
which a winner takes all. It is worth remembering that when Jiang Zemin handed
the reins to his successor, Hu Jintao, in 2002, it marked the first time in
the republic’s history that the transfer of power didn’t involve bloodshed or
purges. What’s more, Hu was not a protégé of Jiang’s; they belonged to
competing factions. To borrow a phrase popular in Washington these days, post-
Deng China has been run by a team of rivals.
今年是中华人民共和国诞生60周年，中国的执政党不再由个别强硬的人来领导，如毛泽东，邓小平。取而代之的是中国最高权力机构，政治局和常务委员会。在这些机构中，它们其实分为两派，而且这两派（在内部）还互相争斗，争权夺势，当然，共产党内部存在的争斗也不是什么新鲜事。
但是这样的争斗己不再是赢家通吃的“零和”游戏了。（“零和游戏”是指：在一项游戏中，游戏者有输有赢，一方所赢正是另一方所输，游戏的总成绩永远为零。）值得一提的是，2002年，江泽民把统治大权交给他的继任者胡锦涛，它开创了共和国历史上权利交接的先河，
一次没有发生流血事件或清除异己行动的权利交接，更值得一提的是，江并不是胡的靠山，他们属于两个竞争的派系。用当今华盛顿（借指“美国政府”）一个流行的词语来说，
后邓小平时代下的中国是“派系斗争”的时代。
This internal competition was enshrined as party practice a little more than a
year ago. In October 2007, President Hu surprised many China watchers by
abandoning the party’s normally straightforward succession procedure and
designating not one but two heirs apparent. The Central Committee named Xi
Jinping and Li Keqiang—two very different leaders in their early 50s—to the
nine-member Politburo Standing Committee, where the rulers of China are
groomed. The future roles of these two men, who will essentially share power
after the next party congress meets in 2012, have since been refined: Xi will
be the candidate to succeed the president, and Li will succeed Premier Wen
Jiabao. The two rising stars share little in terms of family background,
political association, leadership skills, and policy orientation. But they are
each heavily involved in shaping economic policy—and they are expected to lead
the two competing coalitions that will be relied upon to craft China’s
political and economic trajectory in the next decade and beyond.
一年多以前的党内争斗还历历在目。在2007年10月，出乎许多中国观察家意料之外，胡主席不顾党内常规的直接继任程序，指定两个而不是一个继任者，都是50来岁，但风格迥异的习近平和李克强。中央委员会推选习近平和李克强进入由九个常委组成的，也被认为是未来领导人培训基地的政治局常务委员会。这两人肯定会在下一届，也就是2012年的党代会后担任领导职务，而且他们的所要担当的职务也基本确定：习将成为主席一职的候选人，李将接替总理温家宝。
这两位后起之秀，尽管在家庭背景，政治关系，领导才能以及政策取向上都相差很大；但他们每一个都将对经济政策有决定性的影响；在接下来的10多年里，他们将带领这争斗的两派去谋划中国政治和经济的蓝图。
One thing is for sure: They have the profoundly difficult task of quickly and
effectively transforming the country’s long-standing model of export-led
development. That task will require a delicate balance of innovative reforms,
further market liberalization, and occasionally, strong government
intervention to reshape China’s economy into one driven largely by domestic
demand. It is a daunting challenge, particularly when the men at the helm
differ so profoundly. There are bound to be power struggles. But there is also
a good chance that these everyday rivals, understanding that the party’s
survival hangs in the balance, will put aside infighting to guide China out of
the crisis.
有一件事是毫无疑问的：他们的任务艰巨，他们要尽早且有效地，实现长期以出口为主导的发展模式的转变。这就要求政府在创新改革，推动市场自由化，和为实现以内需为主要经济增长方式，而采取有力的干预行为之间找到一个巧妙的平衡点。这注定是一个艰难的挑战，尤其对这些风格迥异的执政者来说更是如此。虽然出现权力之争在所难免，但对于这些平日里的对手，在清楚政党安危未定的情况下，这也是一个彼此搁置内部争斗，战胜危机的绝好机遇。
The team of rivals arrangement is not a choice, but a new necessity for the
Chinese leadership. In elevating both Xi and Li in 2007, Hu signaled the
importance of the different constituencies each represents and the belief that
only consensus-building will successfully forestall serious political upheaval
in the so-called fifth generation of leaders, of which Xi and Li are members.
The idea of turning rivals into allies “for the sake of the greater good,” as
Abraham Lincoln put it, has been widely cited in the Chinese media. A recent
article published in China Youth Daily, one of the most popular newspapers in
the country, called the “team of rivals” (zhengdi tuandui) a “brilliant idea
to achieve political compromise in order to maximize common interest and
political capital for survival.”
（中国领导层）出现的派系斗争的局面不是一个选择与否的问题，而是一个有无必要的问题。2007年在擢升习和李之时，胡就表示过每人代表不同选区的重要性，并且他还认为只有意见保持统一，才能确保包括习和李在内的，所谓的第五代领导集体，不出现大的政局动荡。这种正如阿伯拉罕.林肯所说的“为了最大的善”而化政敌为盟友的观念，在中国媒体被广泛引用。中国最畅销的报纸之一
“中国青年报”，最近出版的一篇文章称，“派系团队”用政治妥协以实现共同利益和政治生存空间的最大化上面，的确是一个很了不起的主意。
The two groups can be identified as the “populists” and the “elitists.” The
populists are currently led by President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao.
Members of their core group, including Li Keqiang, Director of Party
Organization Li Yuanchao, and Guangdong Party Secretary Wang Yang, are known
as tuanpai, after the Chinese Communist Youth League through which they
advanced their careers. Most tuanpai—they now make up 23 percent of the
Central Committee and 32 percent of the Politburo—served as local and
provincial leaders, often in poor inland provinces, and many have expertise in
propaganda and legal affairs. President Hu is himself a tuanpai, and the
leaders of this faction are widely regarded as his longtime confidants; most
of them worked directly under Hu in the early 1980s, when he headed the youth
league. Tuanpai are known for their organizational and propaganda skills, but
they are lacking when it comes to handling the international economy. Their
credentials weren’t as highly valued in the Jiang Zemin era, when foreign
investment and economic globalization were stressed above all else, but they
are considered critical now as the risks of social unrest and political
tensions increase.
这两个团体被划分为“平民派”和“精英派”，平民派就是以胡锦涛主席，温家宝总理为代表的这一派。其核心成员，李克强，组织部部长李援朝和广东省党委书记汪洋，都属于“团派”，所谓“团派”，就是从“中国共产青年团”里提拔上去的官员。大部分的团派，现在占据中央委员会23%，政治局32%的席位，都是地级，省级干部，并且通常任职于比较穷的内陆省份。他们大部分在宣传和法律事务上都有经验。
胡主席他本人也是一个团派，并且这个派别的领导干部都是他的心腹，80年代当胡领导共青团时，他们大部分都在胡的手下工作。团派以组织，宣传能力闻名，但他们在处理国际经济事务时却有所欠缺。在江泽民时代，当外国投资和经济全球化压倒一切时，他们的能力没有得到太多赏识。但在社会不安宁因素增多和政局紧张的当下，他们的作用却显得十分关键。
The elitist coalition was born in that Jiang era, and though its two current
leaders—Wu Bangguo, chairman of the national legislature, and Jia Qinglin,
head of a national political advisory body—are little known outside China,
they are among the country’s highest-ranking political leaders. Members of the
core group of the fifth generation elitists, including Xi Jinping, Vice
Premier Wang Qishan, and Chongqing Party Secretary Bo Xilai, are known as
princelings because they are the children of former high-ranking officials.
The fathers of Xi, Wang, and Bo, for example, all once served as vice
premiers. Princelings command 28 percent of the seats in the Politburo today.
Most princelings grew up in the richer coastal regions and pursued careers in
finance, trade, foreign affairs, and technology. Although patron-client ties
are not always strong among the princelings themselves, the shared need to
protect their interests, especially in a time of growing public resentment
against nepotism, is what binds them together.
而“精英派”则诞生于江泽民时代，除了现任的领导人立法委主席吴邦国，和全国政协主席贾庆林，几乎不被外界所知，其他都是中国最高层的政治领导人物。
第五代“精英派”核心成员，包括习近平，副主席王歧山，和重庆党委书记薄熙来都属于“太子党”，因为他们都是前高层官员的子弟。例如，习、王、薄的父亲都曾担任过副总理之职。目前“太子党”在政治局占据28%的席位。大部分的“太子党”都成长于发达的沿海区域，并且从事过金融，贸易，外事和科技领域内的工作。
尽管“太子党”成员间的庇护关系并不是很强，但他们却都有着维护自身利益的共同需求，特别是在民众日益反对裙带关系的环境下，使他们紧紧的联系在了一起。
Of the six members of the fifth generation serving on the Politburo today,
three are tuanpai and three are princelings. The policy differences between
these factions are as significant as the contrasts in their backgrounds. To a
great extent, their differences reflect the country’s competing socioeconomic
forces: Princelings aim to advance the interests of entrepreneurs and the
emerging middle class, while the tuanpai often call for building a harmonious
society, with more attention to vulnerable social groups such as farmers,
migrant workers, and the urban poor.
在政治局第五代（领导集体）中的六个成员中间，三个是“团派”，三个是“太子党”，这两派在政策的分歧就象他们的背景一样悬殊。从很大程度上来讲，他们的分歧放映了这个国家社会经济不同层次上的力量角逐；“太子党”致力于增加企业家和新兴中产阶级的利益，而“团派”则常常号召要建立和谐社会，关注诸如农民，农民工以及城市穷人等弱势群体。
The platforms of Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang, for example, are strikingly
divergent. Xi’s enthusiasm for market liberalization and the continued
development of the private sector is well known to the international business
community. Not surprisingly, his primary policy concerns include making the
economy more efficient, keeping GDP growth high, and deepening China’s
integration into the world economy. Xi is particularly interested in keeping
wealthy elites in China’s eastern coastal region happy.
例如，习近平和李克强在施政方向上就明显不同。在国际经济界，习对市场自由化和私有成分的持续发展的兴趣众所周知。不出意料之外的话，他的政策首要关注的是保持GDP高速增长，和促进中国经济与世界经济的融合。习还对取悦中国东部沿海地区的富人精英情有独钟。
By contrast, Li Keqiang is more concerned about the plight of the country’s
unemployed. He has made affordable housing more widely available and
understands the importance of developing a rudimentary social safety net,
beginning with the provision of basic healthcare. The rejuvenation of the
northeastern provinces, China’s old industrial base and one of its most labor-
intensive areas, appears to be Li’s regional focus. For Li, reducing economic
disparities is far more urgent than enhancing economic efficiency. These
diverging policy priorities between Xi and Li will likely grow in importance
as the men respond to pressing economic questions, such as how China should
react to foreign pressure on the value of the yuan and how the government
should proceed with its stimulus plan.
相比之下，李克强则更关注国内处于困境之中的失业人口问题。他让更多的人买的起房，也很清楚要想发展基本的社会安全网，首先要做的就是要提供基本医疗保障。对于区域发展，李似乎更关注是中国密集人口聚集地之一的东北老工业基地的复兴。对李来说，缩小经济差异远比提升经济效率来得更急迫些。
习和李在面对一些诸如，人民币币值面对外界压力之下，中国应作如何反应？政府应如何推进经济刺激方案？等一些紧迫的经济问题时，他们在施政重心上的分歧将可能显得尤为突出。
Despite their many differences, the fifth generation of tuanpai and
princelings share a common trauma: They are part of China’s “lost generation.”
Born after the founding of the People’s Republic, they were teenagers when the
Cultural Revolution broke out in 1966. They lost the opportunity for formal
schooling as a result of the political turmoil, and many of them were the
“sent-down youths,” young men and women who were moved from cities to rural
areas and who worked for many years as farmers.
尽管存在着这么多的差异，但作为第五代的“团派”和“太子党”却有着共同的精神创伤:
他们属于中国“迷惘的一代”。出生于共和国成立之后，1966年“文化大革命”爆发时，他们还是青少年，政治的动乱剥夺了他们正规学习的机会，他们大部是“下乡知青”---年青的男女从城市下放到农村，和农民一样，在土地上经年累月的劳作！
Princelings Xi Jinping and Wang Qishan were sent from Beijing to Yanan, in
Shaanxi Province, where they spent years on farms. Tuanpai Li Keqiang and Li
Yuanchao labored in some of the poorest rural areas in Anhui and Jiangsu
provinces. Such arduous and humbling experiences forced these future leaders
to cultivate certain traits, such as endurance, adaptability, foresightedness,
and humility. They not only had the unusual opportunity to come to know rural
China, but they also had to adjust to a completely different socioeconomic
environment. This adjustment forced them to learn at an early age how to
handle challenges and how to compromise. Xi Jinping recently told the Chinese
media that his time in Yanan was a “defining experience,” a “turning point” in
his life.
“太子党“习近平和王歧山从北京下放到陕西延安的农村,并在那里他们度过了很多年。
“团派”李克强和李援朝则分别下放到安徽和江苏最穷困的农村地区。如此艰辛而又卑微的经历也使这些将来的领导人物身上，具备了隐忍，适应能力强，目光长远，谦逊的品质。他们不但有过不寻常的机会去体验中国的农村，他们还必须调整自己去适应完全不同的社会经济环境。在这调整的过程当中，使他们在还年青的时候，就已经学会了如何应付挑战，如何去做出妥协。习近平最近在中国的媒体上说，他在延安的岁月是一段“决定性的经历”，是他人生的一个“转折点”。
If there is another event that approaches the importance of the Cultural
Revolution in the lives of these men, it is undoubtedly the Tiananmen Square
incident in 1989. We don’t have much information about how the incident
affected them individually, but they are a generation older than many of the
protesters, and at the time, several were municipal leaders or chiefs of the
youth league. It is clear that they appreciate, as a group, that China’s
leadership during Tiananmen was deeply divided over how to respond to the
unrest. They also realize that the internal struggle aggravated the crisis and
ultimately culminated in a brutal response.
These events taught the fifth generation two lessons: First, they must
maintain political stability at all costs, and second, they should not reveal
their fissures to the public. Although these leaders wear their differences on
their sleeves, there is solidarity at the highest level, inspired by past
unrest, to avoid any sign of a split in the leadership, which would be
dangerous for the party and for the country.
如果说还有另外一个事件，有近似于“文化大革命”对这些人所产生的影响的话，那无疑就是1989年发生的“天安门广场”事件。我们不大清楚这一事件对他们各自所产生的影响到底有多深，但我们知道，在当时，他们比大多数的抗议者要年长一些，有几个已经是市级领导干部或共青团的负责人。但作为同属于一个党派的他们，肯定也已经意识到了，中国当时的领导层在面对“天安门”事件时，对于如何应对（学生的）游行示威活动时意见发生了严重分歧。他们也意识到了，党内的争斗反而加剧了那一次危机，最终（党内争斗）达到白热化，以（政府）残暴的回应方式作为收场。
So, what do these profound differences and influential shared experiences tell
China watchers about how the next generation will steer the Chinese economy?
The economic prowess of the princelings will be essential to responding to the
macroeconomic challenges the country will face this year and beyond. And the
sensibilities of the tuanpai, versed as they are in organization and
propaganda, will be invaluable as China responds to social problems born
of—and exacerbated by—economic stagnation.
这些事件给第五代（领导人）上了两课： 第一，他们必须不惜一切代价保持政治稳定；第二，他们不应在公众面前暴露他们关系上的裂痕。尽管这些领导人公开他们的分歧，
但受过去（政治）风波的启发，（党的）最高层还是保持在稳定状态，以避免任何威胁党的领导和国家安定的苗头出现。
The rise of the team of rivals arrangement may result in fewer policies aimed
at maximizing GDP growth rates at all costs. Instead, it might give way to
policies that provide due consideration to both economic efficiency and social
justice. Already, the ongoing global financial crisis has driven the
leadership to change its emphasis from export-led growth to encouraging
domestic demand, which means addressing rural needs. An ambitious land reform
plan, which was adopted in the fall of 2008, promises to give farmers more
rights and market incentives to encourage them to subcontract and transfer
land. This strategy aims to increase the income of farmers, reduce economic
disparity, promote sustainable urbanization, and ultimately end the century-
long segregation between rural and urban China. Some analysts think that this
land reform, along with a nearly $600 billion stimulus plan announced in
November that favors railroad construction and rural infrastructure
development, will greatly boost the country’s domestic economy and hopefully
propel China through the current economic crisis.
“派系斗争”局面的形成将可能导致那些全力促进GDP增长的政策会有所减少。而那些在“经济效率”和“社会公平”两方面，都适当顾及的政策会有所增多。实际上，眼下的全球金融危机己促使领导层把施政重点，从出口导向型经济增长向鼓励国内需求上的转变，这也意味着要去满足农村地区的需求。2008年秋，一项比较大胆的土地改革政策开始施行，它给农民更多的权利和市场激励，以达到鼓励他们实现“土地的分包和流转”的目的。这一政策旨在增加农民收入，减少经济差异，促进城市化可持续化发展，最终消除存在于中国百年之久的城乡二元制状态。一些分析人士认为，这项土改政策，以及11月份宣布的，主要用于铁路建设和农村基础设施发展的6000亿美元经济刺激方案，将大大促进国内经济，并且使中国早日度过当前的经济危机。
Although the land reforms largely reflect President Hu’s agenda and the
influence of the populists, leaders from the elitist camp have also been
supporters of these policy initiatives. Political compromise and consensus-
building, not zero-sum factional infighting, have shaped the rural development
and stimulus plans.
尽管土改政策在很大程度上反映了胡主席的政治意图和“平民派”的影响力，“精英派”阵营的领导干部也赞成这些经济刺激政策，但一些农村发展和刺激方案得以通过，不是“零和”的派系争斗的结果，而是依靠（双方所做出的）政治妥协和保持意见的统一。
But China’s new game of elite politics may fail. What will happen, for
instance, if economic conditions continue to worsen? Factionalism at the top
might grow out of control, perhaps even leading to deadlock or outright
feuding. Different outlooks over many issues—including how to redistribute
resources, establish a public healthcare system, reform the financial sector,
achieve energy security, maintain political order, and handle domestic ethnic
tensions—are already so contentious that the leadership might find it
increasingly difficult to build the kind of consensus necessary to govern
effectively.
但是，中国这场新的精英政治游戏，有可能会前功尽弃。举例来说，假设中国的经济形势进一步恶化，中国的命运又将如何？
高层的党派之争有可能会失去控制，甚至陷入僵局，或者彻底的决裂。
在许多诸如，包括如何重新分配资源，建立公共医疗保障体系，改革财政部门，维护政治秩序，缓和国内民族间的紧张情绪等事情上，在高层领导之间已经存在着争议，这就让他们觉得，想要达成一个对有效管理政府很有必要的统一意见是越来越难。
Barring something entirely unexpected, though, the populist policy platform
will prevail over the next three to four years, and the ongoing global
financial crisis will likely push Chinese leaders to increase government
intervention in the economy. Yet there may be a swing in the opposite
direction in 2012 as princeling Xi Jinping succeeds Hu Jintao, similar to the
transition from Jiang to Hu. The establishment of such shifts during
transitions at the top can create a healthy political dynamic that prevents
one faction from wielding excessive power. Because of new leaders’ differences
in expertise, credentials, and experiences, contending coalitions will realize
that they need to find ways to coexist in order to remain in power. They do,
after all, have a common interest in social stability and the shared
aspiration to further China’s rise on the world stage. Given China’s long
history of arbitrary decision-making by one individual leader, this “one
party, two coalitions” practice represents a major step forward—for the party
and the people.
如果没有完全出乎意料之外的事情发生，在接下来的三到四年，“平民派”的政策纲领还将会占据上风，当下的这场金融危机，有很有可能促使中国领导人加大对经济的干预力度。但是，2012年当“太子党”习近平，象当年胡接替江一样接替胡锦涛后，（这样的政治局面）有可能会向相反的方向发展。在高层权力过渡时期，如此的（权力）更替可以产生良性的政治活力，它可以防止任何一派过度谋权。
由于新一代领导人在专长，资格和经验上的差别，争斗的派别都会意识到，为了掌握手中的权力，他们需要极力做到和平共处。毕竟，他们都希望维护社会安定，都想要提升中国在世界舞台上的地位。
由于个人独裁在中国有很长的历史，这种“一党，两派”的局面，对政党，对人民来说都算是向前迈了一大步。
numberscis
收二手或库存的老钢笔、蘸水笔。免费维修钢笔，免费调校、打磨笔尖。尊重世界上所有以匠人性格工作和治学的民族，毋论是日耳曼还是和族。
8楼 大 中 小 发表于 2009-7-1 01:56 只看该作者
王岐山的眼神~~~~~赞~~~~~
大白没有兔
9楼 大 中 小 发表于 2009-7-1 10:50 只看该作者
已阅
老李飞镖
10楼 大 中 小 发表于 2009-7-1 11:03 只看该作者
在政治局第五代（领导集体）中的六个成员中间，三个是“团派”，三个是“太子党”，这两派在政策的分歧就象他们的背景一样悬殊。从很大程度上来讲，他们的分歧放映了这个国家社会经济不同层次上的力量角逐；“太子党”致力于增加企业家和新兴中产阶级的利益，而“团派”则常常号召要建立和谐社会，关注诸如农民，农民工以及城市穷人等弱势群体。
\------------------
说的真是“好”
西门吹牛
11楼 大 中 小 发表于 2009-7-1 19:11 只看该作者
偶不发表意见，偶只是围观群众。
大肚子猫
敏感地带，我的地盘听我的
12楼 大 中 小 发表于 2009-7-3 16:12 只看该作者
俺不相信某一派会始终代表最广大人民群众的根本利益
A.K.
@kevin_ling http://www.lingkun.me 80后雄性草泥马 思想极端，行动诡异，内心阴暗，外表怪蜀 读禁书，看禁片
听摇滚，朋克，金属，民谣，独立音乐 户外暴走曝骑fan，重症网瘾患者，不靠谱伪文青 爱国不爱党的右派青年，自由主义 ...
13楼 大 中 小 发表于 2009-7-3 21:08 只看该作者
扯淡
不管哪一派
都是既得利益者
大肚子猫
敏感地带，我的地盘听我的
14楼 大 中 小 发表于 2009-7-10 17:22 只看该作者
扯淡
不管哪一派
都是既得利益者
+1
针鱼
15楼 大 中 小 发表于 2009-7-10 19:07 只看该作者
7楼nice，长了知识还补了英语
lz也够逗得……不被消灭就好哈
numberscis
收二手或库存的老钢笔、蘸水笔。免费维修钢笔，免费调校、打磨笔尖。尊重世界上所有以匠人性格工作和治学的民族，毋论是日耳曼还是和族。
16楼 大 中 小 发表于 2009-7-10 21:50 只看该作者
引用:
> 原帖由 小翔子 于 2009-7-1 11:03 发表 
>
> 在政治局第五代（领导集体）中的六个成员中间，三个是“团派”，三个是“太子党”，这两派在政策的分歧就象他们的背景一样悬殊。从很大程度上来讲，他们的分歧放映了这个国家社会经济不同层次上的力量角逐；“太子党”致力于增加企业家和新兴中产阶级的利益，而“团派”则常常号召要建立和谐社会，关注诸如农民，农民工以及城市穷人等弱势群体。
> \------------------
> 说的真是“好”
引用:
> 原帖由 大肚子猫 于 2009-7-10 17:22 发表 
> 扯淡
> 不管哪一派
> 都是既得利益者
> +1
那段话除了说明两派的主要分歧是“唯gdp还是唯稳”外.........还表达了什么伟光正的想法了嚒？！？！？
作者不过是为了防止引起外交事端......而刻意地将敏感处掩饰得很隐晦罢了........真不知妳们咋就又看出三个代表的影子来了..........囧........
大肚子猫
敏感地带，我的地盘听我的
17楼 大 中 小 发表于 2009-7-13 18:12 只看该作者
不懂楼上说什么
mybbs1984
地上の人生を無駄にするな！ 毎日毎日を無駄にするな！
18楼 大 中 小 发表于 2009-7-22 09:56 只看该作者
7楼的好文，收藏了
众典鲸鲲
精刻：玉璽、大印；批發：白蛇、河圖、天書、麒麟、霛龜、卿云、嘉禾、獨眼石人、黃帛絹書；代擬：通電、繳文、勸進表；提供假扮狐狸叫、絹書塞入魚腹等售后服務
19楼 大 中 小 发表于 2009-7-23 22:13 只看该作者
团派上去以后就慢慢培植下一代 就成了太子党~
黑与白的 没有纯粹的
都是乌鸦 没有白的 干净的
只是团派让 制度又延续了 如同是张居正让腐朽的明朝延续了70-80年
WJ87
无产阶级煽动家
20楼 大 中 小 发表于 2009-10-14 21:48 只看该作者
引用:
> 原帖由 bafield 于 2009-6-13 10:45 发表
> 
> 管你屁事
很好奇2楼说了啥
FIFA会员
（%@￥守正不辟邪￥@%）别自作多情了，我又不是为了你
21楼 大 中 小 发表于 2009-10-15 18:49 只看该作者
两党制苗头？
浮云
22楼 大 中 小 发表于 2009-10-15 19:57 只看该作者
就这么一个裆，里面还有这么多JB，复杂啊。。。
我卖糕的 该用户已被删除
23楼 大 中 小 发表于 2009-10-15 20:06 只看该作者
它开创了共和国历史上权利交接的先河，
不是权利，而是权力。
亨廷顿的文章好吗？他连魔鬼教官、莫之许、王力雄的一半水平都不到吧。
比如对团派的分析，丫不过是一个企图劳权捞钱的小圈子。什么代表社会弱势群体。
再如习。丫只代表太子党。对于私营业主，丫还是和老权贵一个德行。利用和压制，和卫生巾一样。
温柔的慈悲
档中央有宝
24楼 大 中 小 发表于 2009-10-15 21:09 只看该作者
只看不说话，最后明白的笑了。
numberscis
收二手或库存的老钢笔、蘸水笔。免费维修钢笔，免费调校、打磨笔尖。尊重世界上所有以匠人性格工作和治学的民族，毋论是日耳曼还是和族。
25楼 大 中 小 发表于 2009-10-15 22:31 只看该作者
1、以学术性论文的标准来看，此文尚可。基本恪守了自由派政治学人一贯的行文方式（详参正清、飞力、景迁、斐德等人的汉学著作）。大家只想知道你看到、读到谁做了什么，以及这些事情以怎样的脉络供学理分析。至于诛心之论啥的.......还是算了吧........
2、若以人民群众喜闻乐见的传记体为标准，此文是垃圾。
3、中国人的权谋、韬晦，无论官方或非官方、阴谋或阳谋，基本很难翻译成英语，在政治学范畴内更是“摸不到边”的东西。譬如“坐实”、“集中体现、代表......xx的最高、根本、最终.....利益”、“枪打xx鸟”、“树倒猢狲散”、“既要当xx又要立牌坊”........能论证至此，委实不易。
4、亨廷顿是创刊人，非作者。从笔触和名字看作者应该是某中国留学生。
5、顶烙铁的那哥们现在看到2楼对您的回应了么？！？！？
Jyamolmiry
两岸猿声啼不住，党的政策亚克西。
26楼 大 中 小 发表于 2009-10-15 23:06 只看该作者
照这么说，江坚持露面就是为了传达党内很团结的消息的不得已的举动咯？
何生远
没有保护人的人
27楼 大 中 小 发表于 2009-10-16 15:33 只看该作者
飞行家－人类
2楼 大 中 小 发表于 2009-6-13 10:45 只看该作者
提示: 该帖被管理员或组长屏蔽
=========================
哇赛，这个地方也有管理员屏蔽阿，
